Linda Colley (1996) identified three key 'glues' for the British Union state created in 1707: extensive wars with France; a uniting sense of Protestantism; and a burgeoning commercial and military empire. This article explores how two key parts of this project -namely, 'unionism' and a collective sense of 'Britishness' -has become increasingly disconnected in different parts of the United Kingdom. In particular, it examines the extent to which, following Colley's historical argument, white and Protestant citizens remain more likely to identify with political Unionism and Britishness as compared to other ethnic and religious groups. The discussion includes an analysis of the degree to which 'feeling British' and 'valuing the Union' overlap, and whether a connected unionism can be discerned against trends which increasingly place emphasis on the sub-state nation as a key political community of attachment and identity.
Introduction
In her influential study of the forging of British national identity, Linda Colley (1996) identified three key 'glues' for the Union state created in 1707: extensive wars with (first Catholic, then Revolutionary, then Napoleonic) France; a uniting sense of Protestantism; and a burgeoning commercial and military empire. The British project, bringing together England, Wales, Scotland and -much more problematically -Ireland, was forged in war, sanctified by God, and rewarded through profit. In this article we explore how two key parts of this project -namely, 'unionism' and a collective sense of 'Britishness' -has become increasingly disconnected in different parts of the United Kingdom. In particular, we will explore the extent to which, following Colley's historical argument, white and Protestant citizens remain likely to identify with political Unionism and Britishness as compared to other ethnic and religious groups. The discussion includes an analysis of the degree to which 'feeling British' and 'valuing the Union' overlap, and whether a connected unionism can be discerned against trends which increasingly place emphasis on the sub-state nation as a key political community of attachment and identity.
Disconnected Unionisms
Unionism across the United Kingdom has long comprised quite different histories and traditions. In explicit party political terms the 'Unionist' label came to prominence during the Irish Home Rule crisis of the 1880s. Under pressure from Irish Nationalists Gladstone committed to a Dublin legislature as part of a rather vague and evolving policy of 'Home Rule All Around'. Gladstone's puzzle was how to secure and strengthen the United Kingdomlot least the Union between Britain and Ireland -whilst accommodating growing Irish self-assertion within it. 'Home Rule' aspired to a delicate balance between the ultimate sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament, and the interest of national partners within the UK. In event of doubt or conflict, Gladstone insisted, Westminster must prevail:
… I define the essence of the Union to be this … A supreme statutory authority of the Imperial Parliament over Great Britain, Scotland, and Ireland as one United Kingdom ... The unity of the Empire must not be placed in jeopardy; the safety and welfare of the whole ... must be preferred to the security and advantage of the part. Gladstone (1886) Although Gladstone explicitly eschewed the term 'federalism' this was, arguably, his general direction of travel. But reforming visions of the union were swamped by hostility. Irish Home Rule tore the Victorian Liberals in two with a Whiggish 'Committee for the Preservation of the Union' joined by more radical figures led by Joseph Chamberlain. Adopting the name 'LiberalUnionist' the schismatics made common cause with the Conservatives. 'Unionism' was thus sharply re-defined and mobilised as trenchant defence of the Constitutional status quo and, in particular, opposition towards the 'Irish threat'. Alliance in Opposition was followed by formal Coalition in Government from 1895, and amidst the Ulster Crisis of 1912 the two parties formally merged. The intention had been to name the new entity 'The Unionist Party', but grassroots criticism led to the more cumbersome 'Conservative and Unionist Party' (Lexden, 2012) .
This brief excursion into anti-Home Rule politics reveals the broad and changeable nature of 'Unionism' even in a Westminster Parliamentary context. Gladstone's proposals were themselves cut from fundamentally unionist cloth, his paramount principle maintaining 'the essence of the Union'. The reaction explicitly (and successfully) appropriated the term 'Unionist' and thus, for a century and more, it defined 'the Union' as the Constitutional status quo and denoted trenchant resistance to any and all federalist or devolutionary (let alone separatist) proposals to alter that Union.
Furthermore, post-Edwardian anti-Home Rule politics demonstrated a crucial and rapid territorial disconnection. In two constituent parts of the UK, the 'Unionist' party label was preferred over 'Conservative' and thus stamped the term explicitly and politically thereafter. In Scotland the party was termed the 'Scottish Unionists' with 'Unionism's distinctive symbolism and imagery … jealously guarded … to the extent that the term Conservative was expurgated from all official [Scottish] Unionist literature' (Seawright, 1996:96) . The Unionist label was dropped in Scotland only in 1965. The other deviation was, and, is Northern Ireland where Unionism continues to define one side of a fierce territorial, political, religious and ethnic struggle over status and power. The adoption of the terms by Scottish Conservatives, and its ongoing Northern Irish associations has led to a complex identity for the 'unionism' in Scotland and Wales. For the Conservatives it was a badge of pride, for Nationalists it was an accusation to throw at Liberal and Labour. Only very recently has the term crept back into the political lexicon to (uncomfortably) encompass all those who oppose further autonomy/independence for Wales and Scotland.
To cast this debate in a contemporary light, the media in Scotland routinely described 'Better Together', the cross party platform campaigning for a Scottish 'No' in the 2014 referendum, and their three key constituents -the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties -as 'unionist' (see, e.g., Reid, 2013 , Scotsman, 2013 Sunday Mail, 2013; BBC 2014) . In light of the long campaign leading up to 2014 there was a broadening out of the term 'unionist' to reflect a range of views, straddling the federalist heirs of Gladstone (Liberal Democrats), those proposing further devolved powers (Labour and at various times the Conservatives), and those proposing little change, or opposing any further change whatsoever (at other times the Conservatives). Notably, however, unionism remained an awkward term: and one all too rarely found in the formal rhetoric of Better Together, let alone Scottish Labour, or the Scottish Liberal Democrats. For example, neither the terms unionist nor unionism featured in these parties' 2011 election manifestos, nor in the 64-page interim report of Scottish Labour's Devolution Commission in 2013 (Scottish Labour, 2011 Scottish Liberal Democrats, 2011) . Likewise the four keynote speeches at Scottish Labour's 2014 conference in Perth contained no references to unionist/unionism (Scottish Labour 2014).
That having been said, neither did Labour explicitly eschew these terms until several months after the referendum. In January 2015 the new leader and deputy leader both explicitly distanced themselves from unionism. Jim Murphy insisted that he had "never been a unionist", noting that his ethnoreligious background precluded it: "As a family of Irish Catholic immigrants, we're not unionists. I grew up in a family of trade unionists, but we're not political unionists" (quoted in Clegg 2015) . Several days later Kezia Dugdale echoed this rejection: "The first thing I would say is that I don't define myself as a unionist, it's not what shapes my politics" (quoted in Sunday Mail 2015) Given the term unionist has been politically and religiously coded in Scotland, and thus viewed with deep discomfort amongst many Labour activists, it is clearly a meaningful term in Scotland's political landscape. By sharp contrast the term 'Unionist' more or less disappeared from England's Conservative politics from the 1920s: the removal of the Irish Question from Westminster politics in 1921 also removed any urgency to proclaim a 'Unionist' position. As an illustration of this, the extensive online archive of the Margaret Thatcher … since the Act of Union, Scotland has had a proud history as a distinctive nation within the United Kingdom. We in this Party believe in a Scotland that continues to play a full part in the Kingdom and on equal terms. Now that every other Party in Scotland is challenging that role, it is vital that we defend it. Some people say that we're not a Scottish Party. But neither are we an English Party nor a Welsh Party nor an Irish Party. We are a Party of the whole United Kingdom. We are the Conservative and Unionist Party. And we will always be a Unionist Party. Thatcher (1988 Thatcher ( -see also 1985a Thatcher ( and 1985b Conservative Unionism in the later twentieth century, therefore, operated at the UK's national peripheries and had two key purposes: to placate and reassure Northern Ireland's British-Protestant community and to rally local troops against Nationalist and devolutionary sentiment in Scotland and Wales. 'The Union' seems to have had little or no resonance at the centre (i.e. England) except in relation to these (more or less) pressing threats to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom. The very meaning of 'the' Union and of 'unionist' cannot, therefore, be taken for granted. Like 'Britishness' these are historically malleable terms with quite different resonances (and perhaps little resonance at all) in different parts of the United Kingdom. The unionist glue, so to speak, has historically had its key functions at the edges of the British Union, in Scotland, in Wales and -par excellence -in Northern Ireland. It is less clear the extent to which, if at all, unionism matters in England.
The remainder of this article, then, seeks to explore the assumption -implicit in Linda Colley's analysis of the 'glues' that hold the UK together -that people supporting the Union and identifying most strongly with Britishness were historically likely to be white, Protestant citizens. To what extent, we ask, does this characterisation hold today? This is a pertinent question given the profound social and cultural transformations that have taken place in the UK over the last century. The UK is no longer the homogenously 'white' place it once was; through the decolonisation movements of the post-war period, and increasing immigration more recently, the UK is now a de facto multicultural country (even if recent UK governments have eschewed the policy of multiculturalism). Likewise, the decline of 'Protestant Britain', through the rise of religious pluralism and then a wave of thoroughgoing secularisation from the 1960s, have created a multi-faith, and perhaps post-Christian society (see, e.g., Brown 2009). So how does concepts of Unionism and Britishness filter through the diverse society(ies) of the UK? Do white Protestants still invest the greatest attachments in Britishness and the Union (as Jim Murphy's implied incommensurateness of unionism and Irish Catholic immigrant heritage might imply), or have other ethnic and religious groups adopted these attachments as part of their integration?
This article, therefore, focuses on a series of interlinked questions. Firstly does Britishness (still) matter, at personal and political levels, across the United Kingdom? As a litmus test of this, does Britishness possess a unifying, integrative purpose? That is, to what extent do different ethnic and religious groups -including white, minority ethnic, Catholic, Protestant, no religion and other faith -embrace a sense of Britishness and how does this compare to their views on or sub-state identities such as being Scottish or English? Does unionism -in its broad sense of defending the continuing territorial integrity of the United Kingdom -matter, and, if so to whom? Finally we analyse the degree to which 'feeling British' and 'valuing the Union' overlap.
On (Not) Feeling British
Britishness, like any other identity, is not 'fixed' and 'flat' but malleable and historically and contextually specific. What it meant in 1915 is not what it means in 2015; and what it means in suburban London may not be at all what it means in rural Wales. Further, as Colley (1996:6) reminds us 'Identities are not like hats. Human beings can and do put on several at a time'. We should not, then, think of national/territorial identities as a zero sum matter -rather, individuals mix, prioritise or nestle their identities with and within others. In terms of national/territorial identities it is no contradiction to feel, for example, British and Scottish and European and Jamaican, or to prioritise one or other of these in different situations. Furthermore, there has been considerable academic and governmental interest in Britishness and its (lack of) capacity to fully integrate and welcome a range of ethnic communities (see e.g. Parekh 2000; Modood 2007 ). Thirdly, the politics and rhetoric around 'race', ethnicity and multiculturalism play out very differently in different parts of the United Kingdom (see, e.g., Hepburn 2014; Hepburn & ZapataBarrero 2014) . Whilst Westminster politics has long featured a hostile agenda around immigration and race -and has recently witnessed a stampede towards the right in response to UKIP's strident anti-EU and antiimmigration rhetoric (Birrell, 2013 ) -the political situation at Holyrood is radically different. Here a demographic crisis of an ageing (and until recently shrinking) population, along with Scottish 'myths' around inclusion, have fed a cross-party consensus (if not a broader public view) that a welcoming attitude towards migrants is both an economic necessity and a Scottish 'tradition' (see Hepburn, 2011; Hepburn & Rosie, 2014) .
To what extent, if at all, do these different nuances around unionism and around race/inclusion mirror the extent to which people describe themselves as British across the component parts of the United Kingdom? To unpick these questions we examine data from major datasets between 2009 and 2011, i.e. the period immediately prior to the long campaign around Scotland's 2014 independence referendum. To begin the analysis we report responses to an 'open' question on British identity whereby the respondent is shown a card naming a number of possible identities (British, Irish, European, etc) and prompted to choose as many (or few) as they feel are personally relevant and to volunteer other identities that may not be on the card. The wording of the question in the 2011 British Social Attitudes survey was:
Please say which, if any, of the words on this card describes the way you think of yourself. Please choose as many or as few as apply. There are four key points to take from Table 1 and which underpin our subsequent analysis and argument. First, simple arithmetic supports Colley's point about 'hats': many people in each territory chose more than one identity. Key amongst these are those who chose both their 'state' identity (i.e. being British), and the 'sub-state' identity of their territory (i.e. being English, Scottish, or Welsh). There are some differences in this across territory -in England 34% chose a combination of English/British; in Wales 31% were Welsh/British; and in Scotland 39% were Scottish/British. We should not assume that these dualities are directly comparable. There are a number of claims, for example, that whilst Scottish and Welsh people draw a relatively clear distinction between Britishness and their sub-state identities, in England any distinction is fuzzy (Bond & Rosie, 2010; Langlands, 1999; Kumar, 2003) .
It should also be noted that different measures of identity can produce much higher reservoirs of such dual identities (see, for example, Bond & Rosie, 2002 , 2010 .
The second point relates to Britishness, which represented a majority in both England (68%) and Wales (61%), but just half of respondents in Scotland (49%). We should be wary in assuming that Britishness means the same thing in each place and that there is just 'less of it' in Scotland. As noted, the term 'British' (as with any other identity) must be treated with critical caution: its meaning and nuance may, in fact, be quite varied (this is particularly clear in Northern Ireland, as explored below). This leads us to the third point which concerns 'sub-state' identities. In England slightly more people chose being British than chose being English: in Wales the two identities were broadly equally chosen; whilst in Scotland considerably more people chose to describe themselves as Scottish. The position of Britishness relevant to the 'local' national identity thus differs markedly across Britain Finally no other proffered territorial identity has widespread popularity (though about one-inseven respondents in Wales felt English).
Northern Ireland is missing from Gallagher, 1995) . Indeed a sharp cleavage between state identity (actual or desired) is at the very heart of Northern Ireland's Troubles "and for most people national identity boils down to a mutually exclusive choice between British or Irish" (Bond & Rosie, 2010: 86. See also Coakley, 2007) . In 2003, for example, just 3% of people in Northern Ireland reported feeling both British and Irish; likewise just 4% felt both Irish and Northern Irish, and just 13% as both British and Northern Irish. Given the much lower incidence of overlap between identities, Northern Irish surveys tend to ask only for which identity 'best' describes the respondent. This is directly comparable to a follow up question in the British and Scottish surveys which asks respondents who have chosen two or more identities to indicate which of these 'best describes the way you think of yourself'. Table 2 , then, shows responses to that question of 'best' identity. In England we again find that Britishness 'outweighed' Englishness, though not by a very great deal; whilst in Wales we saw rather greater weight given to Welshness (with just over half choosing this as their 'best' identity). In Scotland, quite notably, a very large majority (75%) selected Scottishness as their best identity, compared to just 16% who chose Britishness. Clearly -and as other studies have shown -the primary national identity at play North of the Tweed is Scottishness (see, e.g. McCrone, 1997; Kiely et al, 2005; Bond & Rosie, 2010) . In Northern Ireland we see a different pattern again with three identities having prominence -British, Irish, and Northern Irish. To a large extent -as we shall see -the first two of these are religiously, ethnically and politically coded 'opposites', whilst Northern Irishness identity may serve, to some extent, as an 'escape route' from these: We constructed binary logistic regression models to identify key predictors of choosing a 'best identity', respectively, as British and as Irish. The independent variables explored were gender, age (in years), religion, and whether or not the respondent described themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority. We found very striking religious and ethnic effects. Taking the religious first, Protestants were more than twice as likely to claim a British 'best identity' as the non-religious, whilst Catholics were just one one-ninth as likely. In other words Protestants are -with age, sex and ethnicity held constant -around twenty five times more likely than Catholics to claim Britishness as their preferred identity. As we will see when we consider the other territories this is a remarkable and perhaps unparalleled level of difference.
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that respondents describing themselves as 'minority ethnic' in Northern Ireland were very unlikely to describe themselves as British. Members of such groups, perhaps, regard themselves as outside, and unwilling to be aligned within, a fierce conflict over territory and identity. This view was supported by our model on Irishness which indicated that Catholics were around fifty times more likely (other variables being held constant) than Protestants to choose being Irish as their 'best identity'. Here too we found that minority ethnic respondents highly unlikely to choose an Irish identity: both 'Irish' and 'British' are heavily coded in Northern Ireland, and do not offer a comfortable identity for minorities.
Britishness in England
In sharp contrast to Northern Ireland we have much better data coverage for England. There is also a very different pattern of identity: on the 'open' question choosing Britishness was embraced by a majority in almost all ethnic/religious sub-groups, and even in groups where it was not (amongst respondents born outwith the UK and amongst the 'Asian: Other' and 'Other' ethnic groups), it was chosen by around half. That is, Britishness in England seems to be a relatively open, broadly 'civic' identity, with no clear and exclusive ethnic basis (see Cohen, 1994 Britishness in England, then, is an open and 'civic' identity, but it was one more open to -or at least more frequently chosen by -certain minorities. To an extent this pattern may be explained by the extent to which the other main identity found in England -Englishness -is ethnically coded. Logistic regression on whether respondents feel English found that being of minority religion and minority ethnicity were very important negative predictors: in particular, Asians, Blacks, and Muslims were highly unlikely to select an English identity. Given this, for at least some within these groups Britishness may be the only 'UK' identity they feel appropriate or open to them. Britishness, therefore, operates as a 'civic canopy' which can accommodate those who feel comfortable with Englishness, but also those who do not.
Being British in Wales
Unpicking relationships in Wales is difficult because of the limitations of recent surveys. Nevertheless, as table 3 shows, we can discern some broad trends. Birthplace is crucial, with clear differences between those born in Wales and those born in England. For those born in Wales, being British was less frequently chosen than being Welsh (82% as compared to 56%); for those born in England far more (80%) choose being British than choose being Welsh (16%). Notably (though not shown in the table) half (48%) of the England-born in Wales also describe themselves as English. Whilst an English identity is highly salient for this group, it is Britishness that emerges as the key identity.
We are sorely limited in taking this analysis further, however, since we only know the birthplaces of respondents in the 2011 survey. The lack of minority ethnic and minority faith respondents in the surveys makes it impossible to draw any conclusions for Wales, though the CRE (2006: 35) found that participants in Wales, including BME respondents, were more likely to describe themselves as Welsh rather than British. We do have sufficient data to suggest that intra-Christian differences are modest. Catholics seem (although the sample size is small) to be less likely to choose being Welsh, though this may well be largely explained through birthplace. 'Other Christians' -incorporating those Protestant groups which were historically strong in Wales -are no more or less likely to choose being Welsh, but do appear to be less likely to describe themselves as British: Kiely et al 2001; Rosie 2012 ) that a very substantial proportion of the differences found in claiming Scottishness disappear when we control for place of birth. Overall, 83% of respondents in Scotland described themselves as Scottish and 49% as British. Amongst respondents born in Scotland, however, Scottishness rose to 94%, whilst Britishness remained at 49%. Three points are important here: Scottishness is very widespread in Scotland and claimed by almost everyone born in Scotland; Britishness, however, is also claimed by substantial numbers (including around half of the Scotland-born); and many respondents claim to be both Scottish and British. The position of minorities is interesting: although some sample sizes are small -these are indicated in the table through asterisks -there is no apparent pattern across religion or ethnicity when we control for birth-place. We find that choosing Scottish identity is ubiquitous amongst the Scotland-born in all groups. If Britishness plays a 'civic canopy' role in England, it appears to be Scottishness that fulfils this function in Scotland. Again this chimes with the small-scale CRE study, which found that "In Scotland and Wales -and this was true among both white and ethnic minority participants -there was a much stronger identification with each country than with Britain" (2006:35): Hussain & Miller, 2006, on Scottish Pakistanis and Saaed et al (1999) and Hopkins (2004 Hopkins ( , 2007 Here, as in Scotland, there were class and age effects (older people are more likely to be unionist, working class people less likely) and more modest national identity effects. In England an English identification was not significant, but those who felt British were half as likely again to be unionist as those who did not.
Conclusion
Surveys in the period immediately prior to the long campaign around Scotland's independence referendum illuminates how both Britishness and 'unionism' varied across the different territories of the United Kingdom. It revealed the very different ethnic and religious 'coding' (or not) of Britishness across territory, and the broad irrelevance of ethnic and religious division outside Northern Ireland with regard to unionism. In England Britishness proves to be a 'civic canopy', an identity claimed across all sorts of ethnic groups. Notably, such a role in Scotland is played by Scottishness.
These differences beg the question of what 'the Union' might mean for different Britons in different places. Certainly the Union remains the defining question in Northern Irish politics, and is a key question in Scotland (and, increasingly, Wales) . But there is evidence that those who believe in the unionist integrity of the United Kingdom -measured in terms of Northern Ireland and Scotland remaining part of the UK -are overwhelmingly supportive of devolution in these islands (or at least for its so-called peripheries). Almost 130 years on Gladstone's rather fuzzy vision of Home Rule All Around has been largely embraced. And this fuzzy constitutional settlement does not seem to unduly concern (or, perhaps, interest) the UK's ethnic minorities.
In Scotland such minorities feel Scottish and are just as likely to support (or oppose) further constitutional change as their fellow Scots. In Northern Ireland minorities locate themselves between (or perhaps outwith) the religionational divide. In England, despite very high levels of Britishness amongst some minorities, these exhibit little particular anxiety on Scotland's place within the UK. This may be suggestive that England's minorities to some extent conflate England and Britain (as do their ethnic majority neighbourssee Langlands, 1999) : a post-union Britishness may seem contradictory, or even endangered, in Scotland and Northern Ireland (and, in all probability, Wales) but may make sense in England because of the lack of a clear distinction there between 'state' and 'sub-state' identities.
What future, then, is there for unionism and for Britishness? Overall, the latter seems in better health, taking the UK as a whole, than the former. Unionism has splintered into different 'peripheral' visions and has largely withered in the centre. That respondents in England show a remarkably similar pattern of opinion on Scotland's future to respondents in Scotland suggests one of two things: that they are 'sold' on the benefits to the UK of devolution to the other nations, or that they are quite relaxed about Scotland making its own decisions on most matters. Unionism, then, seems to have become flexible and territorially specific, even to the point of its own disappearance. Britishness, on the other hand, remains a widespread identity even if what we mean by 'British' may differ, and indeed may differ quite substantially, across these islands. That diversity may be a strength far more than it is a weakness, and allow a flexible Britishness to survive further constitutional change. Finally, Britishness in England continues to operate as a unifying and civic identity under which ethnic minorities can be accommodated -and shows little sign of being troubled by any prospective 'break up of Britain'.
